Case of the Month Archive

Juvenile court has authority to issue restraining order against dependent child. . .

In affirmance, the Sixth District held that in a dependency action, the juvenile court has authority under W&I C §213.5(a) [injunctions in dependency proceedings] to issue a restraining order against a dependent child; the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a one-year restraining order against child in favor of child's mother, where child physically abused her mother, made a threat to bomb mother's house and where reunification services for mother had already been terminated.

When D.B. was 15 years old, she gave birth to her son (J.G.). A few months later, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children's Services (the Department) received competing referrals relating to J.G.'s safety. D.B. and her mother each accused the other of using and/or leaving drugs around the house and engaging in verbal and physical altercations in front of J.G.

In June 2023, mother alleged D.B. repeatedly punched her in the face and shoulder over an argument about feeding J.G. Mother called law enforcement, and police officers arrested D.B. Ultimately, the district attorney declined to file charges against D.B. and D.B. was released from juvenile hall. Mother, however, refused to allow D.B. to move back into her house. D.B. also could not reside with father due to his conviction of domestic abuse against his former partner. As a result, the Department filed a dependent proceeding, with mother's agreement, and placed D.B. in protective custody.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared D.B. a dependent child and removed her from her parents' custody. The juvenile court ordered supervised visitation with mother and unsupervised visitation with father.

In October 2023, mother requested that reunification services be terminated, since D.B. was unwilling to participate in visitation. At the hearing for mother's request, D.B.'s counsel indicated D.B. was in agreement with terminating reunification services. The juvenile court granted mother's request.

In December 2023, mother filed an ex parte request for juvenile restraining orders against D.B., who at that time was 17 years old. This request was filed pursuant to W&I C §213.5(a) [injunctions in dependency proceeding]. In her request, mother alleged that D.B. made harassing phone calls and a false welfare check that caused police to stop by mother's house. Mother also claimed D.B. threatened to bomb her house by sending her an image of her house on fire. The juvenile court granted a temporary restraining order and set the matter for trial.

At the outset of trial, the juvenile court (Santa Clara County's Schwarz) concluded that W&I C §213.5(a) provides dependency courts with authority to issue a restraining order against a dependent child. The juvenile court also concluded it is in D.B.'s best interest to hear mother's request in the dependency action, since D.B. had legal representation and the juvenile court was familiar with the family's history. At the close of trial, the juvenile court issued a one-year restraining order against D.B. In so ruling, the juvenile court noted that in addition to the testimony of the parties, it considered "'everything in the juvenile court file[.]'" D.B. appealed, but the Sixth District affirmed.

In a matter of first impression, the panel held that W&I C §213.5(a) authorizes a juvenile court to issue a restraining order against a dependent child in favor of a parent. In reaching this conclusion, the justices noted that statutory text, legislative history, and practical considerations all support their holding. First, the statute itself provides that a juvenile court may enjoin "a person" from specified conduct, including "disturbing the peace of any parent, legal guardian, or current caretaker of the child, regardless of whether the child resides with that parent, legal guardian, or current caretaker[.]" The justices determined that, for these purposes, "person" includes a dependent child after noting that Cal Rules of Court, rule 5.502(5) defines "child" as "a person under the age of 18 years." The justices further noted that the statute expressly authorizes the juvenile court to issue a restraining order to protect any person "regardless of whether the child resides with that parent..." For that reason, the panel rejected D.B.'s argument that a parent whose reunification services have been terminated does not qualify for protections under the statute.

Second, the justices noted that the legislative history also supports their conclusion, since the Legislature enacted the statute in question in 1989 with the aim to protect persons from abuse or harassment in dependency proceedings, whether the threat comes from an adult or a child. Moreover, the Legislature has since made amendments to the statute with the stated purpose to increase efficiency and coordination and expedite the resolution of juvenile restraining orders within a single forum.

And third, the justices described the practical consequences of D.B.'s position, noting that even if mother had initiated a separate civil action to request a restraining order against D.B., the matter would have ultimately been heard by the juvenile court, per CCP §374.5. That statute provides, "A proceeding initiated by or brought against a minor for any of the injunctions or orders described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 372 or subdivision (a) of Section 374 shall be heard in the court assigned to hear those matters; except that, if the minor bringing the action or against whom the action is brought has previously been adjudged a dependent child or a ward of the juvenile court, the matter shall be heard in the juvenile court having jurisdiction over the minor." For this reason, the justices observed that D.B.'s interpretation would lead to the absurd result of mother having to file her request as a separate civil action, only for the matter to be rerouted back to the juvenile court.

The juvenile court must consider the best interest of the child. . .
The justices next held that when evaluating requests for restraining orders against a dependent child under W&I C §213.5, the juvenile court must consider the best interest of the child. On this point, D.B. argued that issuing such a restraining order is never in the child's best interest. The justices disagreed, noting that "a restraining order may be the last tool available to protect both parents and teens from violence within the family, even if the person restrained is the child."

With these legal principles in mind, the justices concluded the juvenile court's issuance of a restraining order against D.B. was in fact in her best interest. First, since D.B. was almost 18 years old when the events in question occurred and given D.B. and mother's pattern of escalating confrontations, D.B. ran the risk of entering the adult criminal justice system if she harmed her mother after reaching the age of majority. Second, the evidence demonstrated that after the issuance of the temporary restraining order, D.B.'s behavior at her placement and therapy significantly improved. And third, the juvenile court limited its order to one year, instead of the maximum of three years, demonstrating thoughtful exercise of its discretion.

Juvenile courts may consider reunification as a factor. . .
During oral argument, D.B. argued that juvenile courts must consider reunifying the family when deciding whether to issue a restraining order against a dependent child. The justices disagreed, noting that although a juvenile court may consider family preservation as a factor when deciding such cases, the statute does not require such consideration in every juvenile restraining order case.

Finally, the justices concluded that the sufficiency of the evidence supported the restraining order and that issuing such restraining order did not violate D.B.'s constitutional right to reunify with her mother. In the former instance, the justices noted the juvenile court based its determination on the text message that D.B. sent to mother as well as the entire dependency file. In the latter instance, the justices concluded D.B. waived her constitutional argument. Not only was mother's reunification terminated months prior to the court's issuance of the restraining order, but D.B. agreed to the termination at the time.

Accordingly, the Sixth District affirmed the juvenile court's restraining order.