| [1] | IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR |
| [2] | No. B141041 |
| [3] | 90 Cal.App.4th 34, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 270
|
| [4] | June 22, 2001 |
| [5] | IN RE MARRIAGE OF DENISE AND THOMAS
ROSSI. DENISE ROSSI, APPELLANT, v. THOMAS ROSSI, RESPONDENT. |
| [6] | APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard E. Denner, Judge. Affirmed. (Super. Ct. No.
BD250668) |
| [7] | Michael J. Berger for Appellant. Claudia Ribet;
Phillips, Lerner & Lauzon and Marc Lerner for
Respondent. |
| [8] | The opinion of the court was delivered by:
Epstein, J. |
| [9] | CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION |
| [10] | Denise Rossi appeals from a postjudgment order in this
dissolution case, awarding all the lottery winnings concealed by Denise
during the dissolution proceedings to her ex-husband, Thomas
Rossi. *fn1 Her argument is two-fold: that Thomas had unclean
hands, and therefore was not entitled to a share of the lottery prize, and
that her conduct did not meet the statutory definition for the penalty
because she believed the prize to be her separate property. |
| [11] | We conclude that the family court's findings that Denise intentionally
concealed the lottery winnings from Thomas and that her conduct
constituted fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294 are
supported by substantial evidence and that there was no abuse of the
court's discretion. |
| [12] | FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY |
| [13] | Denise and Thomas were married in 1971. In early November 1996,
Bernadette Quercio formed a lottery pool with a group of her co-workers,
including Denise. Each member of the pool contributed $5 per week. Denise
contributed her $5 for a short time--three weeks--but, according to her
papers, on December 1, 1996 or about that date, she withdrew from the
pool. |
| [14] | In late December 1996, Ms. Quercio called Denise to say that their
group had won the lottery jackpot. The jackpot prize was $6,680,000 and
Denise's share was $1,336,000, to be paid in 20 equal annual installments
of $66,800 less taxes, from 1996 through 2015. According to declarations
by Denise and by Ms. Quercio, Ms. Quercio told her that she wanted to give
Denise a share in the jackpot as a gift. Denise explained: "I was afraid
to tell [Thomas] because I knew he would try to take the money away from
me. I went to the Lottery Commission office and told them I was married
but contemplating divorce. They told me to file before I got my first
check, which I did. I believed that the lottery winnings were my separate
property because they were a gift." In early January 1997, Denise filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
She never told Thomas about the lottery jackpot. She used her mother's
address to receive checks and other information from the California
Lottery because it would be safer since Thomas would not see the lottery
checks. |
| [15] | Thomas was served with the dissolution petition in January 1997. He
and Denise talked about a settlement the same day. Thomas was not
represented by counsel in the dissolution proceedings. He and Denise met
with Denise's attorney. According to Thomas, he was given several papers
to sign to finalize the dissolution. These included a marital settlement
agreement and a judgment of dissolution. There is a dispute between the
parties about the actual date of separation and why the date of separation
was listed as June 27, 1994. |
| [16] | Denise filled out a schedule of assets and debts dated January 27,
1997; a final declaration of disclosure; and an income and expense
declaration dated January 30, 1997. She did not reveal the lottery
winnings in any of these documents, either as community or separate
property. Because Thomas did not have an attorney, Denise also filled out
Thomas's schedule of assets and debts. |
| [17] | The marital settlement agreement was approved as part of the judgment
of dissolution. Paragraph 9.1 of the marital settlement agreement is a
warranty about disclosure of assets: "Each party warrants to the other
that prior to the effective date of this Agreement neither was possessed
of any property of any kind or description whatsoever other than the
property specifically mentioned in this Agreement, and that such party has
not made, without the knowledge and consent of the other, any gift or
transfer of any property within the past three years. If it shall
hereafter be determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction that one
party is now possessed of any property not set forth herein . . . such
party hereby covenants and agrees to pay to the other on demand an amount
equal to the full market value of such property on the date hereof or on
the date of judgment in any action to enforce the provisions of this
paragraph." (Italics added.) |
| [18] | Paragraph 9.4 of the marital settlement agreement also relates to
disclosure of assets: "Each party has fairly and with candor disclosed all
of the property in which either has a claim or interest, whether or not
the claim or interest is separate or joint property. Each party has fully
disclosed to the other the nature and extent of any interest in all
property and warrants that its valuation is, to the best knowledge of that
party, a fair and candid valuation and that there have been no events
which would materially affect the value of any property." (Italics added.)
Finally, paragraph 9.7 of the marital settlement agreement provides: "The
parties have no separate property other than what he or she has earned or
accumulated after separation. Those items, if any, are specifically set
forth in Exhibits `A' and `B'." The lottery winnings are not listed on the
schedules attached to the marital settlement agreement. Denise testified
that the lottery winnings were not listed on the schedules. |
| [19] | The marital settlement agreement also provided that concealment of
assets was a basis to seek to set aside the agreement and that the party
who was wronged by the concealment could seek payment of one-half of the
concealed property or its value plus one-half of any income derived from
the property. (Paragraph 9.8.) |
| [20] | Judgment of dissolution was entered April 7, 1997. In 1998, Thomas
filed for bankruptcy. In May 1999, a letter was sent to Thomas's home
address, asking if Denise was interested in a lump-sum buy-out of her
lottery winnings. This was the first Thomas knew about the lottery prize.
He confirmed that Denise was a winner with the California Lottery. Thomas
retained counsel, who contacted Denise's attorney. According to a
declaration filed by Thomas's counsel, Denise's attorney confirmed that
she had won a share of a lottery prize, "however, his client was unwilling
to share any `meaningful' amount of the Lottery proceeds . . . ." In July
1999, Denise withdrew $33,000 in lottery winnings to repay a loan made by
her mother in 1980. |
| [21] | In July 1999, Thomas filed a motion to set aside the dissolution of
marriage based on fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and failure to disclose;
for adjudication of the lottery winnings as an omitted asset; and sought
the award of 100 percent of the lottery winnings pursuant to Family Code
section 1101, subdivision (h). *fn2 Thomas
also sought an award of his attorney's fees under section 1101,
subdivision (g). Thomas sought ex parte orders for an accounting and a
restraining order preventing the disposition of any of the lottery
proceeds paid to Denise or of any assets obtained with lottery
proceeds. |
| [22] | The trial court ordered an accounting of lottery proceeds received by
Denise; restrained the disposition of lottery proceeds; and ordered that
all lottery proceeds be placed in a money market account with no right of
withdrawal without court order or joint consent of Thomas and Denise,
except in the ordinary course of business or for necessities of life.
Thomas's original order to show cause was taken off calendar to allow for
discovery. The restraining order remained in effect by stipulation. In
October 1999, Thomas filed a new motion on the same grounds, seeking the
lottery proceeds. This motion was supported by declarations and excerpts
of Denise's deposition. She testified at deposition that it was her intent
that Thomas not get any of the lottery winnings. |
| [23] | In his points and authorities, Thomas asked the court to enforce the
disclosure penalty provision of the judgment of dissolution, provision
"E," which provides that if the court determined that one party failed to
disclose property in the dissolution proceedings, that party would pay "at
least one-half of the full market value of such property" to the other
party. Based on this provision, Thomas claimed at least half of the
lottery winnings. In the alternative, Thomas asked the court to set aside
the dissolution based on concealment and breach of fiduciary duty.
Alternatively, Thomas sought an award of 100 percent of the lottery
winnings pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (h), which penalizes a
breach of fiduciary duty by a spouse in dissolution proceedings. As a
final alternative ground, Thomas argued the lottery proceedings should be
adjudicated an omitted asset pursuant to section 2556. |
| [24] | Denise moved to vacate the restraining order, based on Thomas's
failure to provide discovery. In a supporting declaration, she described
her troubled marriage and Ms. Quercio's gift to her of a share of the
lottery winnings. In the alternative, she asked the court to set aside the
dissolution on the basis of Thomas's fraud regarding the condition of the
family home, which Denise received in the dissolution. She claimed that
Thomas had failed to disclose a $100,000 equalization payment received in
the dissolution when he subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Denise asserted
the lottery winnings are her separate property because the share she
received was a gift, and because the parties were already separated when
the group hit the jackpot. Thomas filed a response, reiterating his
arguments in support of an order awarding him the lottery
proceeds. |
| [25] | The trial court found that Denise intentionally failed to disclose her
lottery winnings in the marital settlement agreement, the judgment, and
her declaration of disclosure. It found that Denise breached her fiduciary
duties under sections 721, 1100, 2100, and 2101 by fraudulently failing to
disclose the lottery winnings and that she intentionally breached her
warranties and representations set forth in paragraphs 9.1, 9.4 and 9.7 of
the Marital Settlement Agreement. The court specifically found that
Denise's failure to disclose the lottery winnings constituted fraud,
oppression and malice within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294 and
section 1101, subdivision (h). The trial court awarded Thomas 100 percent
of the lottery winnings pursuant to Provision E of the Judgment of
Dissolution, paragraph 9.1 of the Marital Settlement Agreement, and
section 1101, subdivisions (g) and (h). |
| [26] | The trial court found that Denise's evidence that her share of the
lottery winnings was a gift was not credible, and concluded that the
lottery winnings were community property. Denise's motion to vacate the
restraining orders and the cross motions to strike portions of
declarations were denied. The court ordered each party to bear his or her
own costs. Denise filed a timely notice of appeal. |
| [27] | DISCUSSION |
| [28] | We review factual findings of the family court for substantial
evidence, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. (In re Marriage of Hokanson, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p.
994.) "`"In reviewing the evidence on . . . appeal all conflicts must be
resolved in favor of the [prevailing party], and all legitimate and
reasonable inferences indulged in [order] to uphold the [finding] if
possible."' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1,
31.) Because Civil Code section 3294 requires proof by "clear and
convincing evidence" of fraud, oppression, or malice, we must inquire
whether the record contains "`substantial evidence to support a
determination by clear and convincing evidence . . . .'" (Shade Foods,
Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 847, 891.) |
| [29] | The court found that Denise intentionally concealed her lottery
winnings during the dissolution proceedings and that her conduct
constituted fraud, oppression, and malice within the meaning of Civil Code
section 3294 and section 1101, subdivision (h). On that basis, it awarded
Thomas 100 percent of the winnings. |
| [30] | Section 721, subdivision (b) imposes a fiduciary duty on spouses in
transactions between themselves: "This confidential relationship imposes a
duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and
neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential
relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and
duties of non-marital business partners, as provided in Sections 15019,
15020, 15021, and 15022 of the Corporations Code, . . ." |
| [31] | Section 1101, subdivision (h) provides: "Remedies for the breach of
the fiduciary duty by one spouse when the breach falls within the ambit of
Section 3294 of the Civil Code shall include, but not be limited to, an
award to the other spouse of 100 percent, or an amount equal to 100
percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the
fiduciary duty." |
| [32] | Thomas argues that imposition of the 100 percent penalty under section
1101, subdivision (h) was mandatory, once the family court found that
Denise acted with fraud, oppression or malice in concealing the lottery
winnings during the dissolution proceedings. |
| [33] | The correctness of the family court's order awarding Thomas all of the
lottery winnings was based on the finding that Denise's conduct
constituted fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294. Civil
Code section 3294 provides in pertinent part: "(a) In an action for the
breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual
damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant. [¶] . . . . [¶] (c) As used in this section, the
following definitions shall apply: [¶] (1) `Malice' means conduct which is
intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others. [¶] (2) `Oppression' means
despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person's rights. [¶] (3) `Fraud' means an
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact
known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of
thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise
causing injury. . . ." |
| [34] | The evidence established that Denise filed for dissolution after
learning that she had won a share of a substantial lottery jackpot; that
she consulted the Lottery Commission personnel about ways in which she
could avoid sharing the jackpot with her husband; that she used her
mother's address for all communications with the Lottery Commission to
avoid notifying Thomas of her winnings; and that she failed to disclose
the winnings at any time during the dissolution proceedings, despite her
warranties in the marital settlement agreement and the judgment that all
assets had been disclosed. The family court expressly rejected her
evidence that the winnings constituted a gift and, as such, were her
separate property. The record supports the family court's conclusion that
Denise intentionally concealed the lottery winnings and that they were
community property. |
| [35] | Denise argues she committed no fraud because the statutory definition
of that term "denotes conduct much more malicious and vile in nature than
the failure of a physically and emotionally abused woman to disclose an
asset to her husband, whose gambling and money mismanagement problems
detrimentally affected her life and caused her to file for bankruptcy and
caused him to threaten to kill her. In not disclosing what Denise
Rossi believed was her separate property, Denise
Rossi did not intend to deprive Respondent of an asset that
he was entitled to because she felt it belonged to her alone. Denise
Rossi did not believe that she was misappropriating a
community asset, and therefore did not have the requisite fraudulent
intent to deprive Respondent of a community asset." |
| [36] | The problem with her argument is that the court expressly found her
evidence was not credible. The record supports this finding. The court put
it in the following clear terms: "I believe the funds used to purchase the
ticket were community. I don't believe the story about the gift." The
court expressly found that Denise intentionally failed to disclose her
lottery winnings in the marital settlement agreement, the judgment and her
declaration of disclosure. This case presents precisely the circumstance
that section 1101, subdivision (h) is intended to address. Here, one
spouse intentionally concealed a significant community property asset. She
intentionally consulted with the Lottery Commission as to how to deprive
Thomas of a share of the prize; used her mother's address for all
communications with the lottery; and did not disclose the winnings in the
dissolution proceedings. This supports a finding of fraud within the
meaning of Civil Code section 3294. The family court properly concluded
that under these circumstances, Thomas was entitled to 100 percent of the
lottery winnings under section 1101, subdivision (h). |
| [37] | As we observed in In re Marriage of Hokanson, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at
page 993: "The clear import of the language in subdivision (h) is that an
award of attorney fees is discretionary, over and above the mandatory
award of the entire asset at issue." The strong language of section 1101,
subdivision (h) serves an important purpose: full disclosure of marital
assets is absolutely essential to the trial court in determining the
proper dissolution of property and resolving support issues. The statutory
scheme for dissolution depends on the parties' full disclosure of all
assets so they may be taken into account by the trial court. A failure to
make such disclosure is properly subject to the severe sanction of section
1101, subdivision (h). |
| [38] | In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the alternative
grounds that Denise's conduct constituted malice and oppression under
Civil Code section 3294. This conclusion also disposes of Denise's
alternative argument that Thomas should have received only 50 percent of
the concealed lottery winnings pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (g),
which applies when a spouse's breach of fiduciary duty does not constitute
fraud, oppression or malice under Civil Code section 3294. |
| [39] | We find nothing in the language of the statute to justify an exception
to the penalty provision of section 1101, subdivision (h) because of the
supposed unclean hands of the spouse from whom the asset was concealed.
Nor are we cited to legislative history which would suggest such an
exception. None of the cases cited by Denise in support of her unclean
hands defense is a family law case construing section 1101. This undercuts
Denise's primary argument on appeal, that she was justified in concealing
the lottery winnings because of Thomas's behavior. The plain meaning of
section 1101, subdivision (h) disposes of Denise's argument that there
should be a "downward departure in any remedy against Denise" because, as
she claims, she was battered emotionally and physically by Thomas. She
cites federal law to the effect that evidence of the battered woman's
syndrome is a valid basis for a discretionary downward departure of
criminal penalties otherwise applicable under federal criminal sentencing
guidelines, and to California criminal cases addressing this syndrome. As
we have discussed, no such exception is codified into section 1101. The
cases cited are off point. The statutte provides that, where a spouse
conceals assets under circumstances satisfying the criteria for punitive
damages under Civil Code section 3294, a penalty representing 100 percent
of the concealed asset is warranted. The statute is unambiguous and no
exception is provided. |
| [40] | Denise also argues that the order must be reversed because Thomas's
attorneys will receive half of the lottery proceeds. Without citation of
authority, she asserts that this is counter to the purpose of section
1101. But the plain language of section 1101, subdivision (h) demonstrates
legislative intent to enforce the fiduciary obligations of spouses to one
another in dissolution proceedings by imposing substantial penalties for
breaches of that duty. The order of the family court in this case is
consistent with that intent. We find no basis to reverse the order of the
family court because of Thomas's fee arrangement. |
| [41] | The family court could have imposed attorney's fees on Denise as an
additional penalty under section 1101, subdivision (h). It chose not to do
so. It was within its discretion in making this order. (See In re Marriage
of Hokanson, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 987 [where breach of fiduciary duty by
a spouse involves conduct not amounting to fraud, oppression, or malice
within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294, an award of fees is
mandatory, in contrast with the discretionary fee provision of subdivision
(h)].) *fn3 |
| [42] | The evidence which we have summarized supports the family court's
order on the alternative ground that Denise violated the terms of the
judgment of dissolution and the marital settlement agreement by concealing
the lottery winnings. This violation triggered Paragraph 9.1 of the
marital settlement agreement: "Each party warrants to the other that prior
to the effective date of this Agreement neither was possessed of any
property of any kind or description whatsoever other than the property
specifically mentioned in this Agreement, and that such party has not
made, without the knowledge and consent of the other, any gift or transfer
of any property within the last three years. If it shall hereafter be
determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction that one party is now
possessed of any property not set forth herein . . . such party hereby
covenants and agrees to pay to the other on demand an amount equal to the
full market value of such property on the date hereof or on the date of
judgment in any action to enforce the provisions of this paragraph."
(Italics added.) |
| [43] | DISPOSITION |
| [44] | The order of the family court is affirmed. Respondent is to have his
costs on appeal. |
| [45] | CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. |
| [46] | We concur: |
| [47] | VOGEL (C.S.), P.J. |
| [48] | HASTINGS, J. |
|
| |
| Opinion Footnotes | |
|
| |
| [49] | *fn1 "We
refer to the parties by their first names `to humanize a decision
resolving personal legal issues which seriously affect their lives,' and
to make our opinion easier to understand. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of
Hokanson (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 987, 990, fn. 2.) The record is
inconsistent as to the parties' last names, reflecting either
"Rossi" or "De Rossi." We use
"Rossi" which is the name on the caption of the order from
which the appeal is taken. |
| [50] | *fn2 All
statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise
indicated. |
| [51] | *fn3
Section 1101, subdivision (g) provides: "Remedies for breach of the
fiduciary duty by one spouse as set out in Section 721 shall include, but
not be limited to, an award to the other spouse of 50 percent, or an
amount equal to 50 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in
breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees and court costs.
However, in no event shall interest be assessed on the managing
spouse." |