| [1] | Supreme Court of California |
| [2] | No. S127874. |
| [3] | 39 Cal.4th 179, 138 P.3d 200, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 49 |
| [4] | July 20, 2006. |
| [5] | In re the MARRIAGE OF Mary Ann and Darrin FELLOWS.
Mary Ann Moyse, Respondent, v. Darrin Fellows, Appellant.
|
| [6] | Enochian & Kenny and Mark D. Norcross, Redding, for Appellant.
Edgar J. Lana and Robert J. McNair, Orinda, for Respondent.
|
| [7] | CORRIGAN, J. |
| [8] | We consider whether Family Code section 4502, subdivision (c), *fn1 applies
retroactively and bars a parent from relying on laches to defend an action
to enforce a child support order. We hold that it does and affirm the
Court of Appeal. |
| [9] | I. Facts And Procedural Background |
| [10] | In June 1985, a New York court ordered Darrin Fellows to pay $50.00 a
week in child support to Mary Ann Moyse. Over 17 years later, Moyse
registered the child support order in California. She alleged that Fellows
had never made support payments and owed her $26,000 plus interest.
Fellows sought to vacate the registration asserting, among other things, a
laches defense. |
| [11] | The trial court denied Fellows's motion to vacate, confirmed the
registration, and ordered arrearage payments of $20,800. The court noted
that Moyse "testified that no child support payments were made" while
Fellows "testified [that] all child support payments were made." Both
parties "called corroborating witnesses supporting their respective
testimony." The court found that Fellows failed to establish, "by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the child support was
paid." |
| [12] | The trial court applied section 4502, subdivision (c) (section
4502(c)), retroactively and disallowed the laches defense. The section,
added in 2002, provides: "In an action to enforce a judgment for child,
family, or spousal support, the defendant may raise, and the court may
consider, the defense of laches only with respect to any portion of the
judgment owed to the state." Although the court determined that Fellows
had "met his burden of proof as to the defense of laches," it concluded
that the defense was statutorily unavailable. |
| [13] | The Court of Appeal affirmed, declining to follow In re Marriage of
Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 140, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 370 (Garcia ), which held
to the contrary. Instead, relying on Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89,
120 Cal.Rptr.2d 522, 47 P.3d 300 (Rice ), the court concluded that section
4 of the Family Code demonstrates a general legislative intent that future
Family Code amendments "are to be retroactively applied." The court also
noted that the Legislature's intent to right a "perceived injustice ...
dictates the retroactive application of section 4502(c)." Finally, the
court concluded that subdivisions (f) and (g) of section 4 did not compel
a contrary result and that retroactive application did not violate due
process. |
| [14] | We granted review to resolve the conflict between Garcia, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th 140, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 370, and the Court of Appeal opinion
here. |
| [15] | II. Discussion |
| [16] | A. Retroactive Application Of Section 4502(c) |
| [17] | If, in light of the lapse of time and other relevant circumstances, a
court concludes that a party's failure to assert a right has caused
prejudice to an adverse party, the court may apply the equitable defense
of laches to bar further assertion of the right. (Nealis v. Carlson (1950)
98 Cal.App.2d 65, 69, 219 P.2d 56.) The parties agree that section
4502(c), by its terms, bars the laches defense in a private action to
enforce a child support order. They disagree over its application here. We
review the retroactive application of the statute de novo. (In re Marriage
of McClellan (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 247, 254, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 5.) *fn2 |
| [18] | 1. Section 4502(c) Changed Existing Law |
| [19] | As a general rule, statutes do not operate retroactively *fn3 "unless the
Legislature plainly intended them to do so." (Western Security Bank v.
Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d
507 (Western Security ).) Nonetheless, "a statute that merely clarifies,
rather than changes, existing law does not operate retrospectively even if
applied to transactions predating its enactment." (Ibid.) Such a statute
"may be applied to transactions predating its enactment without being
considered retroactive" because it "is merely a statement of what the law
has always been." (Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
599, 603, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 157.) |
| [20] | In determining whether a statute clarified or changed the law, we give
"due consideration" to the Legislature's intent in enacting that statute.
(Western Security, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933
P.2d 507.) The Legislature's declaration of an existing statute's meaning,
while not dispositive, is a factor entitled to consideration. (McClung v.
Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 473, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d
428, 99 P.3d 1015 (McClung ).) We look to "the surrounding circumstances"
as well as the Legislature's intent when determining whether a statute
changed or merely clarified the law. (Western Security, at p. 243, 62
Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507.) |
| [21] | Here, the Legislature intended to change the law. Explaining the need
for the statute, both the Senate Rules Committee and the Senate Judiciary
Committee observed that "the equitable defense of laches remains
applicable in an action to enforce a support order." (Sen. Rules Com.,
Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002
Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, p. 2; Sen. Com. on Judiciary,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7, 2002, p. 2.)
*fn4 According
to the Senate Rules Committee, the enactment of section 4502(c) would
"change that" by "substantially restricting the laches defense in support
enforcement cases." (Assem. Floor Analysis, 3d reading analysis of Sen.
Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, p. 3,
italics added.) Thus, section 4502(c) would "[s]et[] forth new statutory
restrictions on the use of the common law defense of laches in support
enforcement actions." (Assem. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No.
1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) June 25, 2002, p. 2, italics added.) In doing
so, it would close "a loophole that allow [ed] child support obligors to
evade responsibility for their debts." (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7, 2002, p. 3.) "By
amending the statute to close the loophole, the Legislature sought to
change the law." (City of West Hollywood v. 1112 Investment Co. (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 1134, 1145, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 168.) |
| [22] | A review of the law before the enactment of section 4502(c) confirms
that the statute did effect a change. "Prior to 1992, judgments for child
and spousal support expired within a stated period of years." (In re
Marriage of Fogarty & Rasbeary (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1359, 93
Cal.Rptr.2d 653 (Fogarty ).) California courts had recognized a laches
defense in spousal support cases but held that the defense did not apply
to claims for arrearages brought within the statutory enforcement period.
(See, e.g., DiMarco v. DiMarco (1963) 60 Cal.2d 387, 394, 33 Cal.Rptr.
610, 385 P.2d 2; Leiden v. Hudson (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 72, 74-75, 156
Cal.Rptr. 849.) In 1992 and 1993, however, the Legislature made all
support orders enforceable "until paid in full." (Civ.Code, former §
4384.5, now Fam.Code, § 4502, subd. (a).) *fn5 In doing so,
the Legislature cast some doubt on the viability of the laches defense in
support actions. |
| [23] | However, the court In re Marriage of Plescia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th
252, 262, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 (Plescia ), held that the legislative changes
in 1992 and 1993 did not eliminate the laches defense in actions for
spousal support arrearages. Three years later, the Fogarty court followed
Plescia and recognized laches in actions for child support arrearages.
(Fogarty, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 653.) These
precedents were consistently followed until the enactment of section
4502(c) *fn6
The Legislature may certainly amend a statute to overrule a judicial
decision. But, in doing so it changes the law. (See McClung, supra, 34
Cal.4th at pp. 473-474, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 428, 99 P.3d 1015.) |
| [24] | In re Marriage of Cordero (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 653, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d
787, does not alter our conclusion. The Cordero court disagreed with the
reasoning of Plescia, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 252, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, and
opined that support orders less than 10 years old would not be subject to
a laches defense. (Cordero, at pp. 664-665, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 787.) The
court acknowledged, however, that its observation was dictum. (Id. at p.
666, fn. 17, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 787.) Thus, there is nothing to suggest that
the Legislature enacted section 4502(c) in response to any controversy
created by Cordero on this point. Indeed, the legislative history behind
section 4502(c) is replete with references to Plescia, Fogarty, Hamer,
Dancy, and Copeman, but makes no mention of Cordero *fn7 Accordingly,
we conclude that the Legislature enacted section 4502(c) to change
existing law, not to clarify a controversy over its
interpretation. |
| [25] | 2. The Legislature Intended That Section 4502(c) Apply
Retroactively |
| [26] | Before section 4502(c) became effective on January 1, 2003, a viable
laches defense would have barred Moyse's claim. The statute applies to
this case only if the Legislature intended to give it retroactive effect.
We conclude that it did. |
| [27] | While nothing in the language or legislative history of section
4502(c) speaks directly to retroactive application, section 4 of the
Family Code provides guidance. The Family Code was enacted in 1992, and
made operative on January 1, 1994, to create a unified statutory scheme.
(Stats.1992, ch. 162, p. 463 et seq.) It drew together a number of
statutes scattered throughout various parts of the California codes, and
enacted some new provisions. Section 4 provides that, in the Family Code,
the term "new law" describes either the enactment of the Family Code
itself, or future modifications of the code. (§ 4, subd. (a)(1)(A) &
(B).) *fn8 The
term "old law" refers to the law in effect before the Family Code was
adopted. (§ 4, subd. (a)(2).) |
| [28] | Section 4, subdivision (c) provides: "Subject to the limitations
provided in this section, the new law applies on the operative date to all
matters governed by the new law, regardless of whether an event occurred
or circumstance existed before, on, or after the operative date,
including, but not limited to, commencement of a proceeding, making of an
order, or taking of an action." Thus, by its terms, section 4, subdivision
(c), establishes that amendments to the Family Code apply retroactively
unless otherwise provided by law. |
| [29] | The Law Revision Commission comment to section 4 confirms this
interpretation. The Commission explains that section 4 "applies both to
the act that enacted the Family Code and to any later act that changes the
code, whether the change is effectuated by amendment, addition, or repeal
of a provision of the code." (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29C West's Ann.
Fam.Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 4, p. 7, italics added.) The comment then
notes: "The general rule prescribed in subdivision (c) is that a new law
applies immediately on its operative date to all matters, including
pending proceedings," (ibid.) and that section 4 governs the "substantive
provisions" of the Family Code. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., at p. 8.)
Thus, as a general rule, future changes to the Family Code apply
retroactively. |
| [30] | We reached a similar conclusion in Rice, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page
100, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 522, 47 P.3d 300, where we held that the 1995
amendments to Probate Code section 21350 applied retroactively to "
instruments executed before the amendments' effective date." Specifically,
we found that section 3 of the Probate Code "mandates application of the
law as amended in 1995, even though the trust and will were executed prior
to that amendment's effectiveness." (Rice, at p. 99, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 522,
47 P.3d 300.) Section 4 of the Family Code is "comparable" to section 3 of
the Probate Code (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29C West's Ann. Family
Code, supra, foll. § 4, p. 7) and contains virtually identical language *fn9 Thus, Rice
is highly persuasive and consistent with our conclusion that section
4502(c) applies retroactively absent some exception to the rule of
retroactivity found in section 4 of the Family Code *fn10 In re
Marriage of Wood (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1059, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 236 is
disapproved to the extent it conflicts with our opinion today, because the
Wood court did not adequately consider the language and history of section
4. |
| [31] | 3. Section 4, Subdivisions (f) and (g) Do Not Bar Retroactive
Application Here |
| [32] | Notwithstanding the general rule of retroactivity established by
section 4, subdivision (c), Fellows contends the exceptions found
subsequently in subdivisions (f) and (g), bar such application here. The
argument fails. |
| [33] | a. Section 4, Subdivision (f) |
| [34] | Subdivision (f) of section 4 provides that: "No person is liable for
an action taken before the operative date that was proper at the time the
action was taken, even though the action would be improper if taken on or
after the operative date, and the person has no duty, as a result of the
enactment of the new law, to take any step to alter the course of action
or its consequences." Fellows creatively argues retroactive application
would impose new duties on him: (1) to indefinitely preserve written proof
of his compliance with the New York support order, and (2) to strictly
comply with and refuse to orally modify the order. His contention lacks
merit. |
| [35] | Section 4502(c) placed no new duties on Fellows. Both before and after
its enactment, Fellows had a duty to pay his child support, and could
establish compliance through testimony alone. The elimination of a laches
defense did not create some novel proof requirement. Even before the
enactment, prudence would have counseled preservation of written payment
records. Indeed, success on a laches claim is always uncertain because it
is an equitable remedy that depends on "the facts and circumstances of the
particular case." (Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 718, 734,
134 P.2d 777.) Assertion of a laches defense seeks an equitable act of
grace to relieve the burden of an existing obligation. Elimination of the
defense does not create a new duty. |
| [36] | b. Section 4, Subdivision (g) |
| [37] | Subdivision (g) of section 4 is also inapplicable here. It provides
that "[i]f the new law does not apply to a matter that occurred before the
operative date, the old law continues to govern the matter notwithstanding
its repeal or amendment by the new law." (Ibid.) According to Fellows,
subdivision (g) limits the retroactivity rule to procedural changes. He
contends section 4502(c) is a substantive change and must, therefore,
apply prospectively. Nothing in the text or history of section 4 suggests
an intent to distinguish between procedural and substantive changes in
applying the rule of retroactivity. There is no reasoned basis for
adopting such a distinction especially when "California has rejected this
type of classification" in determining whether a statute has retroactive
effect. (Western Security, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, fn. 4, 62
Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507.) |
| [38] | Instead, read together, subdivisions (c) and (g) of section 4
establish that the "old law" will govern only if the "new law" falls
within the other statutory exceptions to the rule of retroactivity or does
not apply to a "matter" previously governed by the "old law." Section
4502(c) does not fall within either statutory exception and applies in
this action to "enforce a judgment for child ... support." |
| [39] | Finally, in In re Marriage of Garcia (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 693,
698-699, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, the court declined to apply the 1993
amendments to the Family Code retroactively and held that the pre-1993
scheme governing support orders still controlled. In re Marriage of
Garcia, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 693, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, did not, however,
consider section 4, and is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with
this opinion. |
| [40] | B. Due Process |
| [41] | Even in the face of specific legislative intent, retrospective
application is impermissible if it "impairs a vested ... right without due
process of law." (In re Marriage of Fabian (1986) 41 Cal.3d 440, 447, 224
Cal.Rptr. 333, 715 P.2d 253, codified in section 4, subdivision (h).) *fn11 Fellows
was not denied due process. |
| [42] | In evaluating a due process claim, we consider two groups of factors:
(1) " '[T]he significance of the state interest served by the law [and]
the importance of the retroactive application of the law to the
effectuation of that interest' "; and (2) " '[T]he extent of reliance upon
the former law, the legitimacy of that reliance, the extent of actions
taken on the basis of that reliance, and the extent to which the
retroactive application of the new law would disrupt those actions.' " (In
re Marriage of Heikes (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1211, 1219, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 155,
899 P.2d 1349, quoting In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583,
592, 128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371.) These considerations support
retroactive application. |
| [43] | 1. State Interests |
| [44] | Stating the need for section 4502(c), the sponsor noted "that over 2
million children in California are owed over $19 million in unpaid
support, and that 'many of these children fail to thrive because there are
not adequate resources to meet their basic needs.' " (Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced May 7, 2002, p. 3.) According to the sponsor, " '[t]hese
non-payors are escaping justice by hiding from the child support system
for long enough to allow a defense of laches to shield them from ever
having to pay the child support they have been court-ordered to pay.' "
(Id., at pp. 2-3.) Eliminating the defense of laches would close "a
loophole that allows child support obligors to evade responsibility for
their debts," (id., at p. 3.) and "strengthen the public policy favoring
enforcement of an obligor's responsibility to pay support." (Assem. Com.
on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002) as amended June
19, 2002, p. 9.) |
| [45] | Fellows concedes that the state's interests in protecting California's
children and enforcing support obligations are compelling. Yet he contends
that retroactive application does not serve those interests. The argument
fails. Unquestionably, the availability of laches impaired the ability of
a parent to collect child support. Eliminating the defense necessarily
advances the state's interest in securing payment of all child support
obligations. Moreover, to the extent obligor parents benefit from their
efforts to evade support obligations through the use of the defense,
section 4502(c) cures this "rank injustice of the former law." (In re
Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 594, 128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546
P.2d 1371.) Notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, "[t]here is
nothing unfair about requiring a parent to fulfill his moral and legal
responsibilities." (in re marriage of cutler (2000) 79 cal.app.4th 460,
476, 94 cal.rptr.2d 156.) Retroactive application is "necessary to
subserve a sufficiently important state interest" (In re Marriage of
Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 593, 128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371),
and our "inquiry need proceed no further." (In re Marriage of Buol (1985)
39 Cal.3d 751, 761, 218 Cal.Rptr. 31, 705 P.2d 354.) |
| [46] | 2. Reliance |
| [47] | The second group of factors is likewise unavailing. Fellows contends
he reasonably relied on the availability of laches in failing to preserve
written proof or to obtain judicial acknowledgment of payment. Fellows's
defense did not fail for lack of proof. In fact, the trial court
determined that Fellows would have prevailed if laches were available.
However, his purported reliance was not reasonable, as discussed
previously. The retroactive application of section 4502(c) did not
"substantially interfere" with his conduct in violation of due process. (§
4, subd.(h).) *fn12 |
| [48] | Accordingly, we also disapprove In re Marriage of Garcia, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th 140, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 370,*fn13 and hold
that section 4502(c) applies retroactively to bar Fellows from asserting
laches. |
| [49] | III. Disposition |
| [50] | The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed *fn14
|
| [51] | WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J., KENNARD, BAXTER, WERDEGAR, CHIN, and MORENO,
J. |
|
| |
| Opinion Footnotes | |
|
| |
| [52] | *fn1 All
further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise
indicated. |
| [53] | *fn2 The
parties do not dispute that section 4502(c) was retroactively applied
here. |
| [54] | *fn3 We
note that the cases use the terms "retroactively" and "retrospectively"
interchangeably. |
| [55] | *fn4 (See
also Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 2002, p. 6 ["laches ... remains a viable
equitable defense in a subsequent enforcement action to collect past- due
child or spousal support"].) |
| [56] | *fn5 In
1992, the Legislature repealed and reenacted Civil Code former section
4384.5, to provide: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
judgment for child or spousal support, including a judgment for
reimbursement or other arrearages, is exempt from any requirement that
judgments be renewed. A judgment for child or spousal support, including
all lawful interest and penalties computed thereon, is enforceable until
paid in full." (Stats.1992, ch. 718, § 3, pp. 3319-3320.) The Legislature later moved this provision to Family Code section 4502, subdivision (a), which provided: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a judgment for child, family, or spousal support, including a judgment for reimbursement or other arrearages, is exempt from any requirement that judgments be renewed...." (As added by Stats.1993, ch. 219, § 143, p. 1650.) |
| [57] | *fn6 See
In re Marriage of Copeman (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 324, 332, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d
801; In re Marriage of Dancy (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148, 98
Cal.Rptr.2d 775; In re Marriage of Hamer (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 712, 723,
97 Cal.Rptr.2d 195. |
| [58] | *fn7 See,
e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, pp. 2-3; Assem.
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg.
Sess.) as amended July 2, 2002, p. 1; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 1658 as amended June 19, 2002, pp. 3, 5-8; Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1658 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) May 7,
2002, p. 2. |
| [59] | *fn8
Section 4, subdivision (a)(1)(A) defines "New Law" as "[t]he act that
enacted this code." Subdivision (a)(1)(B) defines "New Law" as an "act
that makes a change in this code, whether effectuated by amendment,
addition, or repeal of a provision of this code." |
| [60] | *fn9 As
relevant here, Probate Code section 3, subdivision (c), states: "Subject
to the limitations provided in this section, a new law applies on the
operative date to all matters governed by the new law, regardless of
whether an event occurred or circumstance existed before, on, or after the
operative date, including, but not limited to, creation of a fiduciary
relationship, death of a person, commencement of a proceeding, making of
an order, or taking of an action." |
| [61] | *fn10 We
note that section 4 is a general rule, subject to numerous exceptions.
(See, e.g., § 4, subds.(d)-(h).) The Legislature may enact statutes that
direct prospective application. (§ 4, subd. (b).) |
| [62] | *fn11
Subdivision (h) of section 4 states: "If a party shows, and the court
determines, that application of a particular provision of the new law or
of the old law in the manner required by this section or by the new law
would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the
proceedings or the rights of the parties or other interested persons in
connection with an event that occurred or circumstance that existed before
the operative date, the court may, notwithstanding this section or the new
law, apply either the new law or the old law to the extent reasonably
necessary to mitigate the substantial interference." |
| [63] | *fn12
Fellows also contends that section 4502(c) is overbroad because it
impermissibly restricts his right to due process. Assuming that a due
process claim permits an overbreadth analysis (see Tobe v. City of Santa
Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1108, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402, 892 P.2d 1145),
retroactive application of section 4502(c) did not violate his
right. |
| [64] | *fn13
The Garcia court did not consider the language and history of section 4 in
holding that section 4502(c) did not apply retroactively. (Garcia, supra,
111 Cal.App.4th 140, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 370.) |
| [65] | *fn14
Because we conclude that section 4502(c) applies retroactively and bars
Fellows from raising laches as a defense, we do not address Moyse's
contention that the 1993 amendments to the Family Code eliminated the
defense. |