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Cars are not articles of a personal nature under Fam C §852(c) . . .
In reversal, Fourth District holds that trial court erred by characterizing Porsche bought during marriage with wife’s separate property funds (but treated by husband as gift to him) as husband’s separate property
In re Marriage of Buie and Neighbors (December 1, 2009) |
California Court of Appeal 4 Civil D053925 (Div 1) 179 Cal.App.4th 1170, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 387, 2009 FA 1418, per Irion, J (McConnell, PJ and O’Rourke, J, concurring). San Diego County, Brannigan, J, reversed and remanded. For appellant: James Dunne, CFLS, (760) 771-3377 and Anthony Dunne, (619) 232-9260. For respondent: no appearance. CFLP §J.48.0.3. |
Tatia Buie married Walter Neighbors in 1999. Sometime thereafter, Walter paid $60,000 for a 2001 Porsche 996, using funds from Tatia’s separate property checking account. He considered the Porsche to be a gift from her, apparently because he bought it right before his birthday.
The couple later divorced. After a trial on the reserved issues, the trial court found that the Porsche had been transmuted to Walter’s separate property under Fam C §852(c), which provides that a written transmutation is not necessary for gifts of “ ‘tangible articles of a personal nature’ that are ‘not substantial in value’ ” relative to the marital circumstances.
Tatia appealed and the Fourth District reversed and remanded.
Can’t wear a Porsche . . .
Tatia contended that the trial court erred by finding that the Porsche had been transmuted to Walter’s separate property. The justices reasoned that, per Fam C §760, the car was presumed to be community property because it was purchased during marriage. Therefore, they continued, it should be characterized as community property unless Fam C §852(c) applied. The specific language of that statute, the panel found, creates an exception to Fam C §852(a) [transmutation of real or personal property must be in writing] for gifts between spouses “ ‘of clothing, wearing apparel, jewelry, or other tangible article of a personal nature that is used solely or principally by the spouse to whom the gift is made and that is not substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage.’ ” Here, everyone agreed that Tatia had not made a written transmutation; the key question, the panel said, was whether the Porsche was the kind of personal property that could be transmuted without one.
In the olden days . . .
The justices noted that the lower court based its ruling on a finding that the car’s value was not substantial in relation to the parties’ circumstances during their marriage; it hadn’t determined whether the Porsche qualified as a “ ‘tangible article of a personal nature.’ ” In their view, however, that part of §852(c) was ambiguous. Accordingly, the panel looked for guidance from the statutory history, focusing specifically on the California Law Commission’s comment to a proposed predecessor statute, former CC §5110.640(b) [gift presumptions]. There, the panel found, the commission stated that in general, gifts between spouses were presumed to be either community or separate property, depending on what the gift was, but that the gift of an automobile would not create a presumption that it was the recipient’s separate property because “ ‘an automobile is not an article of a personal nature within the meaning of the statute.’ ” (emphasis added in opinion). This legislative history was enough to convince these justices that the Porsche should not be characterized as a tangible article of a personal nature under §852(c). And, given that Tatia had not executed a written transmutation of the car, the trial court erred when it concluded that the Porsche had been transmuted to Walter’s separate property.
Tatia gets her money back . . .
Tatia also argued that if the Porsche was found to be community property, she was entitled to reimbursement under Fam C §2640(b) [authorizes reimbursement of spouse’s separate property contribution to acquisition of community property absent written waiver]. The justices agreed. They pointed out that Walter bought the Porsche with funds that were unquestionably Tatia’s separate property and that she hadn’t executed a written waiver of reimbursement. Therefore, the panel concluded, Tatia was entitled to reimbursement of her separate property contribution to the acquisition of the Porsche under §2640(b).
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Readers who have been practicing law for a long time will remember when we frequently had clients who claimed that the big rock engagement ring or the family heirloom ring was a gift from their soon-to-be-shed spouses, and refused to do the classy thing and return it, while the spouses claimed that it was always understood that the ring would be returned if the marriage didn’t work out. Those cases, along with the ones involving pillow-talk transmutations, were the driving force behind the enactment of Fam C §852. Since then, we haven’t seen a lot of the engagement ring cases; §852 cases have focused on other valuable assets, such as stock certificates, family homes, and hefty 401k’s (those were the days).
The trial court here focused on whether the Porsche was of substantial value in relation to the marital circumstances, but the Fourth District took a different tack, focusing instead on whether it was a tangible article of a personal nature used primarily by the person to whom it was given. Luckily for the panel, the legislative history contains a specific reference to automobiles as not falling within the scope of §852(c) (or at that time CC §5110.640), on which they can base their decision. That doesn’t mean, however, that we should adopt that focus when we have a case involving this issue; when it’s appropriate, it may be more effective to emphasize the substantial value of the alleged gift in relation to the marital circumstances. Whichever approach we use, it’s worth noting that the justices here seem to be advocating a narrow construction for determining whether an item of personal property qualifies as a gift under §852(c), which is in keeping with the original intent of the transmutation statutes to limit the circumstances under which a transmutation can be found.
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