Case of the Month Archive

Husband who endured “ ‘two years of sheer hell’ ” should not be required to finance more . . .

In affirmance, Sixth District holds that trial court did not err in terminating spousal support under Fam C §4325, despite provision in MSA and disso judgment precluding modification or termination, where recipient-spouse was convicted of domestic violence against payor

On November 25, 2002, Gerald Cauley filed for divorce after 18 years of marriage to Eileen. In March 2003, he sought a restraining order, claiming that during the previous year, Eileen had made numerous threats on his life in phone calls and messages, and that she had physically attacked him. The trial court issued a TRO that would expire the following July. On June 25, Gerald and Eileen signed a stipulated disso judgment, which provided, among other things, that he would pay her $5,250 in monthly spousal support until her remarriage, the death of either party, or further court order. The support payments could be modified only if Eileen cohabited with a partner or Gerald’s income was reduced due to disability or job loss; the court’s jurisdiction over support would end on March 31, 2010. The judgment was filed on August 25, 2003.

Meanwhile, on August 6, Eileen flew to Florida, where Gerald was living with his girlfriend and her son. Eileen took items from outside their home, ripped plants from the garden and sprayed herbicide on the rest, killed fish in a pond, stole some personal property, and threw other things into the bay behind the house. When Gerald came to the door, Eileen sprayed him with herbicide; when his girlfriend came home, she sprayed her too. Florida police arrested Eileen for domestic battery. On August 12, Gerald got a Florida TRO. Three days later, Eileen sent his attorney a letter, threatening to charge Gerald with rape if he didn’t have the domestic battery charges dismissed. She followed up with a call to local police in which she made good on her threat by accusing Gerald of rape.

On September 10, 2003, the Florida trial court issued a restraining order against Eileen that was effective for one year and precluded any contact with Gerald. Undeterred by the order, between September 2003 and March 2004, Eileen made more than 1,000 phone calls to Gerald, and left more than 500 voice messages totaling close to 70 hours of recordings. Gerald got an unlisted home number and a new cell number, but the calls continued after Eileen obtained the cell number. She threatened the president of the company where Gerald worked, as well as Gerald’s wife and family members. On one day alone, Eileen left 52 messages on Gerald’s voice mail.

On March 30, 2004, Gerald asked the California court for another restraining order against Eileen, and he filed a motion to modify or terminate spousal support, based on her acts of domestic violence. The Florida court subsequently issued a warrant for her arrest on a charge of felony aggravated stalking, and set bail at $1 million. San Jose police arrested Eileen, and she was extradited to Florida. Ten days later, the California court temporarily suspended spousal support per Fam C §4325, which provides that a criminal conviction for interspousal domestic violence within five years before or at any time after a disso filing creates a rebuttable presumption that spousal support should not be ordered for the abusive spouse; the court set a review hearing for October 18, 2004.

Eileen pleaded guilty in Florida to felony aggravated stalking on May 17, 2004. She was placed on five years’ probation, the terms of which required that she attend anger management classes, undergo alcoholic and psychiatric treatment, and have no contact with Gerald or members of his family. Two weeks after her release from custody, Eileen began making more threatening calls; between May 28 and October 11, she called Gerald over 91 times. The Florida court charged her again with felony aggravated stalking, as well as with violating probation. When Eileen failed to show up for the October 18 review hearing, the California court set another hearing at which she could rebut the Fam C §4325 presumption. Eileen was later arrested on the Florida charges.

At a review hearing on December 15, 2004, Eileen’s attorney made an offer of proof, stating that his client was unemployed, alcoholic, and a convicted felon with no job training; counsel insisted that Eileen had made the latest calls only to find out when she would receive her support payments. Gerald’s attorney countered with two declarations from his client, and told the court that Gerald and his family “ ‘had lived through two years of sheer hell.’ ” Counsel also pointed out that Eileen had been in several alcohol rehab programs, and that she had violated restraining orders in Florida and California. The trial court found that Fam C §4325 applied here and that Eileen had failed to rebut the presumption that spousal support should not be paid. The court ordered that Gerald’s spousal-support obligation be terminated.

Eileen appealed, but the Sixth District affirmed.

It’s just policy . . .
Eileen pointed out that the MSA and the disso judgment precluded modification or termination of support unless she cohabited or Gerald experienced a loss of income. And, she went on, since Fam C §3591(c) precludes modification or revocation of spousal support where a written agreement specifies no mod or termination, the trial court should not have applied Fam C §4325 to terminate Gerald’s support obligation. Gerald countered that enforcing the disso judgment in this case would violate the state’s strong public policy against domestic violence. In order to decide whether the state’s interest in enforcing valid contracts trumped the public policy against domestic violence, the justices found that they were required to carefully balance the interests for and against enforcement. Moreover, the panel continued, public policy should be used to invalidate a contract “ ‘only in cases free from doubt’ ” (citing Rosen v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 135 Cal.Rptr. 361, 70 P.3d 351).

It’s got to stop . . .
When they looked at the factors favoring enforcement, the justices found that there is a strong public policy supporting enforcement of spousal-support obligations. In addition, cutting off support here would impose a significant financial burden on Eileen. However, they noted, Eileen was using her support payments to fund her harassment activities, and “the parties could not have reasonably expected that [Gerald] would finance his own abuse by [Eileen].” Applying Fam C §4325 in this case, the panel reasoned, would further the state’s “ ‘significant public policy’ ” against domestic violence by giving Eileen fewer resources with which to finance her misconduct, which “is extremely serious” and had continued despite restraining orders in two states and incarceration. The justices concluded that on facts like these, the policy supporting enforcement of judgments must yield to the policy against domestic violence. Thus, the lower court had not erred in applying Fam C §4325 or in concluding that Eileen had failed to rebut the presumption that spousal support should cease.

No way out . . .
The panel was not swayed by Eileen’s argument that Fam C §4325 should not apply because Gerald had other remedies, such as contempt actions. That was irrelevant, the justices said. Nor was the panel convinced that, as Eileen argued, the statute did not apply to modifications, since its language clearly indicates that it does. As for her contention that the trial court should have considered the spousal-support factors in Fam C §4320 before applying §4325, the justices noted that the latter specifically states that when the presumption is not rebutted, “ ‘support to the abusive spouse otherwise awardable pursuant to the standards of this part should not be made.’ ” That was a clear indication to the panel that the trial court needn’t consider the §4320 factors when it applies §4325. In conclusion, the justices found no merit in the contention by Eileen that Gerald needed to submit a certified copy of her conviction in order to have §4325 apply, and they concluded that she had waived the issue of the lower court’s failure to deliver a statement of decision by not mentioning her request for one at the end of the December 15 hearing. Given all that, the panel affirmed the trial court’s order.